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I. The DoD Imperative for Performance Based Logistics 
 
"Good logistics is combat power" 
LtGen. William G. Pagonis 
Dir of Logistics during the Gulf War of 1991 
 
A. DoD Logistics  
The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS) establishes a set of 
overarching defense objectives that guide DoD’s security actions and provides direction 
for the National Military Strategy (NMS). It was developed based on the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) process and is focused on preparing DoD to meet 21st century 
challenges.  One of the four implementation guidelines, which it details, is “Continuous 
Transformation.”  The purpose of continuous transformation “is to extend key advantages 
and reduce vulnerabilities.”   
We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct 
business, and work with others. NDS, March 2005 
No area needs transformation more than DoD logistics. In fact, the former Army Chief of 
Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki has said, “You cannot have an Army transformation 
without a logistics transformation.”  This precept can be unarguably broadened—you 
cannot transform the Department of Defense without transforming logistics.  And, while 
transforming many military disciplines there are often little proven precedents, in the 
logistics world, many of the necessary tools and concepts have been proven in the 
commercial world.   
The current Defense logistics budget is well over a $100 billion and is very big business.  
It requires more than a million government people that receive more than 54,000 
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requisitions, process nearly 8,200 contracts, and conduct business with approximately 
24,000 suppliers each day supporting 1,312 major weapon systems.  DoD maintains an 
inventory of 5.2 million different items and 60 inventory reporting systems (Home Depot 
has around 50,000 items and one inventory system).  While each element of the process 
(ordering, procurement, transportation, maintenance, finance, etc.) is digitized, these 
processes are often segmented, and are spread out across 600 different and non-
interoperable information systems.  Optimization, when it occurs, takes place at the 
element or sub-element level, rather than the system level.  The current “system” is 
largely an ad-hoc mix of government and industry, with little cost visibility or 
performance accountability.  An integrated (end-to-end) system does not exist (as it does 






















































Figure 1. Logistics Results: “Successful,” but not World-Class 
The DoD has been making progress, albeit slowly. During the Gulf War in 1991, it took 
five months to deploy troops and equipment to the Persian Gulf, and the logistics support 
2
was developed while forces were not engaged in hostilities.1  The average order to receipt 
time was 49 days.  Based on the supply chain improvements over the last 15 years the 
average order to receipt time has been reduced to 21 days (with a still significant 
variation, from within days to up to a year).  This is an impressive improvement, except 
when one considers the performance of world class commercial distribution that can 
guarantee delivery within 1-2 days domestically, and 2-4 days internationally, with over a 
99 percent reliability (see Figure 1). 
When considering weapon system support specifically, traditional DoD sustainment 
strategies have focused on conducting business transactions to procure parts and services 
in an effort to ensure maximum weapon system availability.  The military services had to 
estimate and compute the requirements; then procure, store, and when required, ship the 
necessary parts.  This meant that DoD customers (military services and agencies) focused 
on ensuring that they had enough spare parts and inventory to meet any need or 
requirement (often referred to as a “just in case” system). This approach tended to 
increase demand (the whiplash effect), compounded by a “supply push,” resulting in 
large inventories.  The customer also bore the costs and risks for forecasting, ordering 
and maintaining inventory, warehousing, managing obsolescence, transportation, 
reliability analysis, configuration management and field engineering.  This approach 
created incentives for the Original Equipment Manufactures (OEMs) and vendors to sell 
more spare parts, and maintenance, while encouraging performance and reliability 
improvements be incorporated in the “next” generation of equipment, often resulting in 
weapon systems with low availability.  Finally, the increased logistics burden assumed by 
the customer meant that there were that many more resources that were not focused on 
core competencies.  As a result of these factors, DoD is far still from world class and, in 
general, significantly less capable than the commercial sector (see Figure 2), yet at far 
higher costs. 
                                                 
1 US Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chainman, Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, “Operation Desert Storm: The Services’ Efforts to Provide Logistics Support for Selected 
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Figure 2. DoD performance compared to commercial firms (Some of this data is adapted from 1998 
DSB report) 
There are several specific drivers for logistics transformation within DoD. These include: 
the rising cost of maintenance and support for new and legacy systems; and long 
customer wait times in support of war-fighters, and the increased flexibility/agility 
required in the new (and largely unpredictable) military environment.  When these are 
coupled with the ever-tightening budget constraints and the documented performance 
improvements and savings from commercial logistics support operations; there is a clear 
requirement to move from the traditional support models.  DoD must move to a world 
class system that is much more efficient in peacetime, and can also quickly adjust to the 
demands of warfare. The benefits include significant increases in availability, reliability, 
along with significant cost reductions. 
It must be recognized, of course, that there are clear differences between commercial 
requirements and the military’s—particularly with regard to the end objective i.e. losing 
sales vs. losing lives.  Thus, a “just in time” supply system would be unacceptable and 
some “buffers” are necessary.  However, with a rapidly-responding, world-class system, 
this can easily be provided for; and DoD unique needs can still be met much more 
effectively, and at far lower costs. 
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B. Why DoD Cannot Get Performance Based Results with Traditional 
Logistics Support 
Inefficiencies with DoD’s traditional logistics support to weapon systems is not a new 
problem. DoD’s traditional approach has been fragmented, with segmented 
accountability and control by various stakeholders (DLA, Services, MAJCOMs, Depots) 
all of which have their own budget requirements and restrictions, and different priorities.  
Additionally, the responsibility for the elements of logistics2 has been shared between 
acquisition activities and sustainment activities.  Traditional logistics metrics are focused 
on internal logistics processes, and rarely have a direct relationship to warfighter 
requirements.  Efforts to optimize these elements often results in sub-optimal results at 
the system level (Devries 2004). 
Furthermore, traditional logistics support dictates processes and design specifications; 
this has the effect of restricting innovation and process improvements.  Suppliers and 
equipment manufacturers are also incentivized to sell more repair parts, vice developing 
and implementing reliability improvements.  As a result of these factors, it is difficult to 
provide truly cost-effective, integrated logistics support using DoD’s traditional model.   
C. PBL is the DoD’s Preferred Product Support Strategy 
The key strategy DoD has identified to transform weapon system support is Performance 
Based Logistics (PBL) (see Figure 4).  The goal for PBL contracts is to provide the U.S. 
military with a higher level of logistics efficiency and effectiveness, to improve 
accountability, and develop products that are more reliable.  Based on the experience of 
the private sector and the pilot programs conducted in DoD, it is widely believed that 
PBL support offers the best approach for long-term support of weapon systems, and their 
subsystems. 
   
                                                 
2 Maintenance planning; supply support; support equipment; manpower and personnel; training; technical 
data; IT support; facilities; packaging, handling, storage, and transportation; and design interface. 
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The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines Performance Based Logistics as 
“…the purchase of support as an integrated, affordable, performance package 
designed to optimize system readiness and meet performance goals for a weapon 
system through long-term support arrangements with clear lines of authority and 
responsibility.  Application of Performance Based Logistics may be at the system, 
subsystem, or major assembly level depending on program unique circumstances 
and appropriate business case analysis.” 
 
When implemented, PBL shifts the focus of the government’s efforts from transactions to 
identifying performance outcomes and assigning responsibilities.  The objective is to 
develop accountability, instead of using control.  With PBL, active management of the 
sustainment process (e.g. forecasting demand, maintaining inventory, and scheduling 
repairs becomes the responsibility of the support provider.  Additionally, it changes the 
incentives for the supplier.  The supplier, with a properly structured PBL program, is now 
incentivized to improve the reliability of systems, and reduce inventories of spare parts; 
and with fewer repairs made and fewer parts sold, the contractor stands to make more 
profit--while from the government’s perspective, PBL results in optimizing total system 
















Figure 3. Spectrum of PBL Strategies (Defense Acquisition University 2005) 
The Program office, using PBL, is free to combine elements of both organic and 
contractor support in varying degrees, leveraging their inherent capabilities, based on an 
overall sustainment strategy (see Figure 3). Some of the other factors that will affect this 
allocation are: a) the age of the system, b) existing support infrastructure, c) organic and 
commercial capabilities and d) legislative and regulatory constraints, such as Title 10 
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requirements (such as the legislated, “no less than 50 percent organic depot maintenance” 
provision)3.  As a consequence, virtually all system support is a combination of organic 
and commercial support services.  Identifying the best combination should be based on 
the best value determination; and must of course, also meet compliance with the existing 
laws, policies, and regulations (Defense Acquisition University 2005).   
D. PBL Attributes 
In an attempt to wring out as much system readiness as is possible from the tightening 
budgets, DoD is adopting PBL, a fundamental shift in the way it supports its weapon 
systems. The following is list of attributes we believe differentiates PBL from more 
traditional support arrangements. 
Delineates outcome performance goal  
The objective of PBL programs is to buy measurable outcomes i.e. those measures of 
effectiveness used, to define the outcomes.  They should, at the top level, be based on 
war-fighter performance requirements; and include only a few simple, realistic, 
consistent, and easily quantifiable metrics (focused on operational performance and 
value-added process indicators).  These metrics can then be linked, through the contract 
vehicle, to supplier incentives. 
A written Performance Based Agreement (PBA) between the user and the program office 
can be used to identify ranges of outcome performance with thresholds and objectives, 
and the target price (cost to the user) for each level of PBL capability.  In most cases, 
focusing on a few measures, e.g. weapons system availability, mission reliability, 
logistics footprint, and/or overall system readiness levels will be sufficient (see USD 
AT&L Memo summary in Figure 4).  Based on these war-fighter requirements, suitable 
metrics can then be developed (Under Secretary of Defense 2004). 
                                                 
3 The CORE considerations cover three Sec. 2462, 2466 and 2469.  Sec.2464 envisages that the DoD 
maintain a core logistics capability that is government owned and operated.  Sec.2466 allows no more than 
50 percent of the funds made available in a given fiscal year to a military department for depot-level 
maintenance and repair workload to be used to contract for performance by non-federal government 
personnel.  Sec.2469 states that a public-private competition is required to move depot-level workload 
valued at over $3M annually from an organic depot to the private sector. 
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Figure 4. Summary of PBL Guidance 
• Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, 30 September 2001.   
The QDR states that “DoD will implement Performance-Based Logistics to compress the supply 
chain and improve readiness for major weapons systems and commodities.” 
• DoD Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” 12 May 2003 
DoD 5000.1’s purpose is to provide management principles and mandatory policies for managing 
all acquisition programs.  Specifically in Enclosure E1.1.17 on Performance Based Logistics it 
directs: 
“PMs [Program Managers] shall develop and implement performance-based logistics strategies 
that optimize total system availability while minimizing cost and logistics footprint.  Trade-off 
decisions involving cost, useful service, and effectiveness shall consider corrosion prevention and 
mitigation.  Sustainment strategies shall include the best use of public and private sector 
capabilities through government/industry partnering initiatives, in accordance with statutory 
requirements.” 
• DoD Mgmt. Initiative Decision (MID) #917 (October 20, 2004). 
The QDR directed the implementation of PBL to “compress the supply chain and improve the 
readiness of major weapon systems.”  This MID directed six pilot programs to test revised 
contracting, programming, budgeting, financial processes, and to facilitate the cultural shift to 
buying performance, vice specific products. 
• Deputy SECDEF Memo, Implementation of Defense Business Board Recommendation to 
Senior Executive Council on Continued Progress on PBL, 4 Feb 2004 
  PBL Being Implemented Sporadically….Directed Each Service to Provide a Plan to 
Aggressively Implement PBL 
 We Must Streamline Our Contracting and Financing Mechanisms Aggressively to Buy 
Availability and Readiness Measured by Performance Criteria. 
• USD AT&L Memo, PBL and the Business Case Analysis (BCA), 20 Mar 2004  
  Requires new and fielded ACAT I & II programs to complete a BCA for a PBL 
sustainment strategies by 30 Sep 2006. 
  Rationale for not pursuing a PBL approach shall be documented 
• USD AT&L Memo, PBL: Purchasing Using Performance Based Criteria, Aug 16, 2004. 
This memo defines top level metric objectives for PBL: 
 Operational Availability is the percent of time that a system is available for a mission or 
the ability to sustain operations tempo. 
 Operational Reliability is the measure of a system in meeting mission success objectives 
(percent of objectives met, by system). 
 Cost per Unit Usage is the total operating cost divided by the appropriate unit of 
measurement for a given system.   
 Logistics Footprint is the Government/contractor size or ‘presence’ of deployed logistics 
support required to deploy, sustain, and move a system.   
 Logistics Response Time is the period of time from logistics demand signal sent to satisfaction 
of that logistics demand. 
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Ensures responsibilities are assigned. 
A PBL effectively switches most of the risk and the responsibility for supply chain 
management from the customer to the supplier, for the system, or part, that is managed.  
For example, pre-PBL, the DoD customer does not have the visibility to make 
financially-sound decisions due to the many “silos” associated with the full spectrum of 
the traditional supply chain management (e.g. acquisition, engineering, procurement, 
comptroller, and logistics).  With a PBL contract, the customer understands the true cost 
of the support, making his financial forecasts and budgets much more accurate.  
Additionally, the PBL metrics, when properly developed, further define the suppliers’ 
responsibilities very clearly.  For example, part or system availability is unambiguous.  If 
the contract calls for the delivery of a part within 48 hours, 95 percent of the time, it is 
evident to all if the supplier is meeting his obligation (Keating 2005).   
Since, with PBL, the customer is freed from the detailed supply chain management, he 
can focus on the higher level tasks.  These include developing the appropriate 
performance outcomes, developing a system supply chain strategy, structuring and 
awarding the contract, and then monitoring and assessing the performance. 
Reduces Cost of Ownership 
PBLs, when properly implemented, will reduce the cost of ownership of DoD weapon 
systems, while improving readiness. This reduction results from the decline in 
inventories, improved supply chain efficiency, replacement of low reliability 
components, and increased system availability.    
Provides incentives for attaining performance goal 
Each PBL should be unique and tailored to its program or situation, and strive to be a 
“win-win” for both the customer and the supplier.  The PBL initiative should then 
fundamentally align the interest of the supplier with that of the customer, and lead 
suppliers to assume greater responsibility for providing ongoing improvements to their 
products.  This approach is designed to provide incentives for the supplier (in most cases 
a contractor), so they are allowed to improve design and processes, and implement 
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commercial best practices.  Once both parties believe they have sufficient data, the 
contract can migrate to a fixed price, with incentives, form.  Cost savings generated from 
supplier-developed and implemented improvements, resulting in increased performance 
and reduced costs, then provide savings for both the customer and supplier.  With cost 
savings shared directly with the supplier, the suppliers are incentivized to undertake their 
own investment strategies to identify and improve low reliability components, enhance 
supply chain efficiency, and use smart decision tools that provide real-time cost and 
performance visibility.  This ultimately leads to improved performance, reliability, and 
reduced costs. 
E. Organization of the Report 
Section I of this report provided a brief overview of the issue, defined PBL, summarized 
PBL guidance, and identified key PBL attributes.  The next three sections are case studies 
of successful PBL programs at the weapon system level (F/A-18), component level 
(aircraft tires), and major subsystem level (submarine acoustic rapid-COTS-insertion 
sonar).  The final section identifies barriers and enablers to PBL implementation, and 
overall conclusions. 
In summary, with this report, the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise 
(CPPPE) has aimed to explore and evaluate three cases of DoD’s implementation of 
performance-based logistics, and identify major key barriers and enablers.   
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II. PBL support for the F/A-18 
A.  Background 
The F/A-18, designed in the 
1970s, is still the backbone o
Naval Carrier Strike Gro
The F/A-18 fighter is a multi-
role aircraft designed to
the roles as either a fighter o
attack aircraft; and flies 
fighter escort, fleet air 
defense, suppression of 
enemy air defenses (SEAD
interdiction, close and deep air support, reconnaissance, and forward air control missions
Along with the Navy and Marine Corps, the F/A-18 serves with seven foreign custome
With its inherent versatility and high reliability, it has proven to be a valuable carrier 








                                                
The newest model, the F/A-18-E/F4, Super Hornet, is an evolutionary upgrade to the F/A-
18 C/D.  The Super Hornet has a greater range/endurance, can carry a heavier payload, 
has enhanced survivability, and a built in potential to incorporate future technologies.  
Since the F/A-18s can be reconfigured quickly to fly a variety of missions, they provide 
the operational commander a great deal of flexibility to respond to changing battle 
scenarios (Naval Air Systems Command 2005).  The F/A-18E/F is built by an industry 
team that includes Boeing, Northrop Grumman, GE Aircraft Engines, and Raytheon—
they employ over 1800 suppliers nationwide.  The Super Hornet entered combat on its 
first operational deployment in 2002 
The Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 inventory (as of 31 July 05) is comprised of:  
 
4 E-model is single-seat, the F-model is two-seat. 
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• 151 F/A-18 A/Bs 
• 530 F/A-18 C/Ds 
• 228 F/A-18 E/Fs (Current)  
o 460 F/A-18 E/Fs Inventory Goal 
• 90 EA-18Gs 
There are an additional 409 operated by seven foreign countries.  This enterprise has a 
significant budget.  As of March 2005, the Navy’s program office, PMA-265, budget for 
FY 2005 was $4.4 billion, with a total budget of $25.7 billion across the FYDP.    
B. F/A-18 Sustainment Strategy  
The F/A-18 Program Office and NAVICP F/A-18 Integrated Weapon System Team 
created an F/A-18 Integrated Sustainment Strategy with a three pronged focus.  The first 
is to create a Virtual Program Office to focus, manage, and lead sustainment efforts of 
numerous government stakeholders.  The second is to use multiple, OEM-centric 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contracts to provide the best value, long-term 
support solution for all F/A-18 A through F and EA-18G.  And, finally, to focus F/A-18 
performance goals on metrics driven by the performance based agreement (PBA) 
between the War-fighter and Program Manager (PM).  
Create a virtual Program Office 
The first step of the comprehensive sustainment strategy was to organize all the 
government stakeholders into a virtual program office to focus, manage, and lead the 
F/A-18 sustainment effort (see Figure 5). These stakeholders included the Naval 
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), the Naval Depots, the Fleet Support Teams, the 
Naval Air Warfare Centers, the Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service 
Command, the DLA supply centers, the NAVAIR program offices for Air Combat 
Electronics Aviation Support Equipment, and of course the F/A-18 Strike Fighter 
Program, the fleet Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments, and the Marine 
Aviation Logistics Squadron.   
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The F/A-18 Program Manager was the overall manager, and the NAVICP F/A-18 
Integrated weapon support team assumed the responsibility of the Product support 
integrator.  These are to act as the program manager’s agent for implementing his 
sustainment vision/objectives; coordinate organic/private sector support to maximize 
readiness at the lowest cost; and, finally to manage all support contracts, memorandums 
of understanding, and memorandums of agreement, to meet the metrics specified in the 
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F/A-18 Virtual Program Office
 
Figure 5. Sustainment Organization (Heron 2006) 
Use multiple Performance Based Logistics contracts to provide best value  
The vision of the sustainment strategy is to develop and implement a comprehensive F/A-
18 support plan that will provide the required readiness for the Navy, while reducing 
resource utilization and costs.  The approach chosen was not to use a single PBL contract 
at the system level, but instead to apply the PBL concept at the sub-system/component 
level.  The implementation involves the optimization of multiple PBL contracts with 
multiple OEMs to provide the best value, long-term support solution for specific F/A-18 
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systems, sub-systems, and components.  This approach is consistent with the commercial 
“best practices” used by successful, low-cost airlines, such as Southwest 5   
PBL metrics driven by a Performance Based Agreement 
The F/A-18 Performance Based Agreement (PBA) was an agreement between the F/A-18 
program manger, the Commanders of the Strike Fighter Wings (Atlantic and Pacific), and 
the Commander Naval Air Forces.  The PBA, approved in the summer of 2005, 
established Ready-for-Tasking (RFT) and Cost-Wise Readiness performance objectives 
for the Navy’s F/A-18 (Heron 2006).  “Cost-wise readiness” is a concept adopted by the 
Navy to find efficiencies in achievement, and to move away from the idea of “readiness 
at any cost.”  It involves evaluating and adopting “best practices” from other disciplines, 
across other professions, to include government and industry, in order to make Naval 
Aviation as efficient and effective as possible (Malone 2004). Once the PBA was signed, 
these performance objectives were integrated into the F/A-18 Integrated Sustainment 
Strategy (Heron 2006). 
C. Contract Details 
F/A-18 Integrated Readiness Sustainment Team (FIRST) 
The central pillar, and by far the largest PBL contract under the integrated sustainment 
umbrella, is the F/A-18 Integrated Readiness Sustainment Team (FIRST) contract with 
Boeing.  The original FIRST contract was awarded by NAVICP on May 1, 2001, and 
created a teaming arrangement between industry and the Navy, to provide material 
supply support, to include provisioning, warehousing, shipping, transportation, 
obsolescence management, reliability improvements, total asset visibility, and 
configuration management for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet.  The overall goal was to 
reduce the Total Ownership cost (TOC), and incentives were provided for innovation and 
efficiency improvement to reduce the Super Hornet total life cycle cost (Aguilar 2005).   
                                                 
5For example, Southwest Airlines has a 10 Year engine maintenance contract with GE Engine Services, 
Inc.  They pay a per flight hour rate for almost all engine maintenance on the airline's 737-300 and -500 
Fleet.  
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The contract gives Boeing responsibility for the support process for parts 
particular to the F/A-18E/F aircraft including responsibility for meeting 
demand requirements, improving system and parts reliability and availability, 
and managing obsolescence. Boeing also became the supply chain manager 
for those parts, including forecasting, parts management, transportation, 
distribution, and warehousing. 
The baseline contract was cost plus incentive/award fee, with three successive one-year 
ceiling-priced options.  In the last two option years, the contract was a fixed price plus 
incentive/award fee.   
In April 2003, NAVAIR awarded a complimentary FIRST contract, with two one-year 
options.  It expanded the contractor’s responsibilities to include the provisions to provide 
integrated logistics support, program management support, in-service engineering, 
support equipment, technical publications, a Support Center, and integrated information 
systems for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet (IDA 2006).   
NAVICP awarded a new, single FIRST contract in December, 2005 that combined the 
separate supply chain management and integrated logistics support contracts (see Figure 
6). The five year, $995M firm fixed price base contract includes a five year extension 
option. This contract includes fleet driven performance requirements, and covers 73 
percent of the Super Hornet’s elements6.  This 73 percent includes 3889 E/F weapons 
replaceable assemblies (WRAs) and shop replaceable assemblies (SRAs), 653 
intermediate level repairables, 349 Support Equipment Items, 170 DLA consumables, 
13,080 DLA second source consumables and 10,970 Non-DLA consumables.  The 
Justification and Authorization (J&A) was approved for $2.9 billion, providing the 
flexibility to expand support to all F/A-18s.  Since NAVICP signed this single contract, 
NAVAIR will transfer their portion of the funds to them. 
                                                 
6 This contract does not currently cover F/A-18 A through Ds WRAs or SRAs or engines, tires, explosives, 
and government furnished equipment. 
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CY 2001 CY 2002 CY 2003 CY 2004 CY 2005 CY 2006-2015
Single FIRST Contract
• Single 5 year FFP Contract with 5 year option 
(Firm Fixed Price contracting vehicle shifts 
performance and financial  risks to Boeing). 
• Provides Navy and Boeing with flexibility to 
resolve sustainment challenges through the 
most optimal combination of additional 
spares, training, redesign, support equipment, 
maintenance planning, etc.
• Facilitates Execution of the F/A-18 Virtual 
Program Office.
• Increases aircraft availability and readiness 
for the Warfighter while reducing contract 
administration. 
• Provides all F/A-18 Stakeholders with single 





Option Yr 2 – FPI/AF
$77.4M




Baseline Contract - CPI/AF
$205.4 M
Option Yr 1 - CPI/AF
$124.6 M
Option Yr 2 - FPI/AF
$126.1 M
Option Yr 3 - FPI/AF
$136.7 M
}FIRST - NAVAIR Contract
- Program Management 
- Unique In Service Engineering 
- Hornet Support Center 
- Integrated Information Systems  
- Sustaining Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
- Support Equipment
- Technical Publications
- ECPs, TSPAT, Etc. 
FIRST - NAVICP Contract
- F/A-18E/F Supply Chain Management
- Provisioning and Warehousing
- Shipping and Transportation 
- Obsolescence Management
- Reliability Improvements 
- Configuration Management
- Material Support and Total Asset Visibility
May 01 – Sep 02 Oct 02 – Sep 03 Oct 03 – Sep 04 Oct 04 – Dec 05
Traditional ILS Apr 03 – Dec 03 Jan 04 – Dec 04 Jan 05 – Dec 05
 
Figure 6. Migration to a Single FIRST Firm Fixed Price Contract 
 
In addition to all of its suppliers and vendors, Boeing has also formed public-private 
partnerships with the Navy depots to combine commercial supply chain capabilities with 
organic repair expertise, and also to comply with section 2464, title 10.  This teaming 
agreement uses Commercial Services Agreement (CSA) to define business relationships 
and Task Description Document (TDD) to define work scope details.  In the Industry-
NADEP partnership, Boeing would provide advanced funding, repair parts, transportation 
to/from NADEP and technical support while NADEP would perform the repair within the 
negotiated turnaround time, provide bulk material, failure data, and suggest reliability 
improvements.  There is also an integrated information technology infrastructure that 
provides total asset visibility (TAV) across the team.  Finally, there is also a Proprietary 
Information Agreement (PIA) to protect proprietary rights of all the parties concerned.   
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To support the remainder of the sub-systems the program office has awarded or has 
pending the award of PBL contracts to support applicable subsystems/components, as 
well as leveraging Navy PBLs that support multiple systems, such as tires (see Figure 7) 
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Figure 7. F/A Awarded and Pending PBLs by Subsytem 
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The (F/A-18A-D) F404 engine PBL 
This sub-system level contract for the F404 PBL was a four and half year, firm-fixed 
price contract, with the possibility of five one-year additional ordering periods.  With a 
cost of $510 million, it was the second largest aviation fixed price PBL contract, which 
includes 36 F404 major sub-assemblies covering 1895 engines where the business case 
eron PBL Presentation).  
It covers the ove
analysis projects $79M in cost avoidance (Jeff H
rhaul of major sub-





The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 
The Honeywell Total Logistics Support 
e 2000 
n lic-
repaired or replaced and provides fly
hour and war-time surge flexibility
Measurable performance metrics are 
used, and include logistics response 
time (LRT), supply material availabili
(SMA) and durability.  The availabili
standard is set at 85 percent with disincentives for an achievement lower than 75 percent 
and incentives up to 3 percent for 90 percent availability.  Pre PBL the SMA was 55 
percent.  The public-private partnership with NADEP Jacksonville leverages OEM “Best 
Practices” efficiencies like Six Sigma and Lean manufacturing (Heron 2006).  
component level PBL is based on a 
commercial ‘Maintenance Service 
Agreement’ and was awarded in Jun
to provide support for APUs used on the C-
2, F/A-18, S-3, and P-3 aircraft.  It is a 10 
year performance-based, firm fixed price 
contract with 5 year base, and 5 one year i
private partnership between NAVICP, NADEP Cherry Point, and Honeywell, with an 
objective of guaranteeing increases in reliability and availability.  The pricing was per 
centive terms.  It was the Navy’s first pub
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flight hour and the contract included obsolescence management, product support 
engineering, and delivery guarantees (Heron 2006). 
Other sub-system level PBLs 
Other sub-system level PBLs awarded include $360 million F/A-18 Displays in 
-18 
ion 
D. Program Performance 
The F/A-18 sustainment strategy was intended to improve readiness and lower support 
 
t to 
ere reduced.   
The improvements in availability were based on process improvements and on 
al (ECP) 
d the 
reduction initiatives is driving a lifetime cost avoidance of $430.2 million (Heron 2006). 
September 2003 for a five year base with two 5 year options, the $99 million F/A
Stores Management System awarded in September 1999 for 15 years and the $20 mill
ARC-210 awarded in February 2001 for 5 years (Jeff Heron Presentation). 
costs (the Business Case Analysis conducted by NAVAIR projected a cost avoidance of
$1.4 billion over 30 years, reduction in repair turnaround time from 60 to 45 days and an 
increase of 10 percent in aircraft reliability (Aguilar 2005)).  The program steadily 
improved Super Hornet mission capable rate (see Figure 8) from a rate of 57 percen
72 percent in 2005. The program has also demonstrated the ability to support aircraft 
availability during wartime—aircraft had a 97.5 percent sortie completion rate during 
operation Enduring Freedom.  Additionally, aircraft carrier depth and range stockage 
effectiveness was 99 percent, and the overall the non-mission-capable for 
supply/partially-mission-capable for supply, and cannibalization actions w
supportability cost reduction initiatives.  The FIRST engineering change propos
process reduced the approval time from the previous 157 days to 39 days, a reduction of 
75 percent.  The average depot turnaround was reduced from 90 days to 45 days, a 
reduction of 50 percent, based on improved parts availability.  One change decrease
beyond capability of repairs rate for the generator control unit (GCU) (previously one of 
the top ten degraders) and increased the intermediated level ready for issue rate from 30 
percent to 75 percent, an increase of 250 percent.  In addition to the improvements to 
performance, the non-recurring investment of $19.8 million in supportability cost 
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Figure 9. “FIRST” Stabilizes the Cost of F/A-18 E/F Spares and Repairs  (Heron 2006) 
 
In addition, the performance of other F/A-18 PBL contracts has also contributed to the 
overall improved readiness (see Figure 10 for summary).  Some details of two major sub-
systems, the F404 engine and the APU, that have made a dramatic impact are provided 
(Heron 2006): 
• The Navy GE F404 engine PBL--availability improved from a historic figure of 
43 percent to 96 percent, while reducing cost per engine flying hour—the highest 
level since its introduction to the fleet. 
• The Navy Honeywell APU total logistics support program--increased availability 
from 70 percent to 90 percent, reduced backorders from 123 to 5, reduced depot 
turnaround time from 98 to 67 days, all with a cost avoidance of $50 million.  
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Sub-System Pre-PBL Post-PBL 
Stores Management 65% 98% 
Tires 81% 98% 
ARC 210 Radio 70% 98% 
F404 Engine 43% 96% 
APU C/D 70% 90% 
APU E/F 70% 100% 
 
Figure 10. PBL Availability Successes 
 
In summary, the F/A-18 sustainment strategy has had a dramatic impact on the readiness 
of the Navy’s frontline fighter.  The creation of the virtual program office has brought 
together the all of the government stakeholders and provided them a single focus—
affordable readiness. The PBL contract metrics were formulated to support the readiness 
requirements of the warfighter, and formalized in an agreement with the program office. 
Then with the aggressive implementation of PBLs the readiness improved dramatically, 




III. Aircraft Tires 
A. Background 
In 1999, the Naval Inventory 
Control Point (NAVICP) was still 
responsible for maintaining the 
Navy’s inventory of aircraft tires, 
and maintained an inventory of 
approximately 50, 000 tires.  The 
Navy was maintaining this large 
inventory, but did not have the 
tools in place to ensure that the 
right tires were in the right place, 
at the right time.  Then a decision 
was made to transfer the inventory management function for tires to a contractor, using a 
performance based contract.  NAVICP, responsible for more than 400,000 items of 
supply, an inventory valued  at $27 billion, and $4.2 billion in annual sales, had already 
used PBL to transform other supply chains, improving performance and reducing costs 
(Mahandevia 2006). 
B.  Contract Details 
In May, 2000 NAVICP issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a PBL contract to 
manufacture and deliver naval aircraft tires to all U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and foreign 
military sales customers (NAVICP 2000).  The contract was competitively awarded in 
April 2001 to Michelin Aircraft Tires Corporation (MATC), Greenville, S.C. This firm-
fixed-price contract had a five-year base (with two five year options) with an estimated 
value of $67.4 million, supporting all 23 types of tires that the Navy uses (NAVICP 
2001).  
Through this innovative contract, Michelin, teamed with Lockheed Martin, serves as the 
single logistics integrator and it is responsible for requirements forecasting, inventory 
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management, retrograde management, storage, and transportation.  Tires deliveries are 
guaranteed (at a 95 percent rate) within two business days for requirements within the 
continental United States, and four days for overseas requirements.  Surge capability is 
guaranteed, at a rate of up to twice the monthly demand rate of each tire type.  The 
contractor also provides a service center that is available 24/7, with web-based access that 
provides real time requisition status, shipping status, and product support information and 
provide data to Michelin to maintain their internal systems(Grosson 2006).  This was the 
first time the DoD contracted out the support for new and repairable tires.  The first five 
year option was exercised in July 2005, with an award of $92, 884 to MATC (DoD 
2005).    
Lockheed Martin is a subcontractor to MATC and manages the support center, as well as 















Figure 11. Program Structure 
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The performance of each subcontract is tied to the requirement in the prime contract, 
ensuring the team members are fulfilling their roles.   
C. Performance  
The program shipped its first tires on July 9, 2001, and today supports 16 aircraft types 
with 23 different tire sizes.  Through mid-2005 the program has successfully delivered 
over 45,000 shipments consisting of 136,000 tires.  The actual customer wait times have 
averaged about 33 hrs for continental U.S. requisitions, and about 59 hours for overseas 
requisitions—on-time fill rates have consistently exceeded the 95 percent minimum and 
have recently approached 99 percent (see Figure 12).  This is a significant improvement 
over the legacy approach--for example, prior to this initiative the tire availability was 81 
















































Figure 12. Tire Performance (Grosson 2006) 
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Finally, the wholesale tire inventory has dropped from approximately 50,000 tires to 
approximately 13,000, with only 2200 of those owned by the Navy (see Figure 13) 











































Performance Review Boards (PRBs) are schedule at six month intervals  
Figure 13. Tire Inventory (Grosson 2006) 
 
This innovative approach, leveraging the commercial supply chain processes, has 
transformed the way the Navy manages its aircraft tire supply chain.  This program has 
virtually taken the Navy out of the business of buying and storing tires, improved the 
performance to the fleet, and is projected to save the Navy over $46 million over the life 
of the contract.   
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IV. A-RCI and Virginia S/CC/A 
 
 A. Background  
The U.S. Navy’s submarine force lost its lead in 
detecting and tracking foreign submarines in the 
1990s.  Other countries began using advanced 
quieting technology on their modern diesel-electric 
submarines.  In addition, the end of the cold war 
was accompanied by reduced research and 
development funding.  As an interim fix, operating 
forces began using carry-on commercial systems in 
an effort to regain some of their previous a
These “black boxes” however, were not fully integrated with the ship’s combat syste
limiting their effectiveness (Kerr 2004). 
dvantage.  
m, 
                                                
Developing unique systems that met military specifications would have cost $1.5 billion 
dollars in development, and $90 million per ship-set; figures that were deemed 
unaffordable. The Navy chose a different path.  The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Submarine Acoustic Master Plan stated a vision for the acoustic capability of  Navy 
submarines :  “Aggressively incorporate flexible, affordable and innovative technologies 
to restore and maintain acoustic advantage, ensuring tactical control, maritime 
battlespace superiority, and comprehensive undersea surveillance(Rosenberger 2005).”  
NAVSEA was tasked and began developing an acoustic system based on commercially 
available hardware and software, designated the Acoustic Rapid Commercial off the 
Shelf (COTS) Insertion (A-RCI) sonar system.7   
This approach leveraged state-of-the-art commercial systems and used advanced signal 
processing algorithms to exploit the much quieter acoustic signatures of the target 
 
7 Key improvements of this sonar implementation include a larger acoustic aperture with precision matched 
acoustic channels, an expanded outboard pressure tolerant electronic component configuration, and the 
ability to pass element level data inboard(Applied Research Laboratory 2006). 
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submarines.  Furthermore, this COTS-based approach reduced the ship-set cost down to 
approximately $10 million.  Since A-RCI was also designed to replace a number of 
different sonar systems with a common system, the Navy was also able to reduce the 
support infrastructure, as well as increase the experience levels of maintenance and 
operational personnel (Kerr 2004).   
The first A-RCI hardware suite consisted of custom cards that were prone to failure, as 
well as difficult to program.  These signal processing cards, although technically a COTS 
product, were very specialized with high procurement costs.  They also required the use 
of an operating system with limited peripheral driver support.  Since this initial 
application used the COTS hardware and software in non-standard configuration, getting 
vendor support and leveraging lessons learned from commercial implementations was 
difficult (Kerr 2004).   
B. Program Description 
The A-RCI is a four-phase program for transforming submarine sonar systems (AN/BSY-
1, AN/BQQ-5, and AN/BQQ-6) from legacy systems to a more capable and flexible 
COTS/Open System Architecture (OSA) and is designated AN/BQQ-10.  In addition to 
providing submarine force with a common sonar system, the COTS/OSA approach 
provided other benefits that include:  added ease of update for technical improvement, 
reduced operations and support costs, improved competition, and increased software 
portability (Boudreau 2006).   
The use of COTS/OSA technologies 
and systems will enable rapid periodic 
updates to both software and h
The program employs a spiral 
development approach to develo
hardware architecture, referred to as a
Technology Insertion (TI), every two 





annual cycle, to create a new software baseline.  This approach allows the Navy to take 
advantage of rapid advances in computer technologies and processes, in the dynamic 
commercial technology market (Rosenberger 2005).   
The first two technology insertions to the A-RCI hardware baseline were done to 
eliminate most of the custom cards used in the initial system configuration, and to 
provide improved display performance.  Elimination of the custom cards reduced system 
cost, improved system reliability, and made software programming easier and faster.  
Now, instead of having to code at an assembly level to discrete hardware components, the 
code could be written in a high-level language (typically C).  This enabled the maximum 
use of COTS operating system features.  Additionally, this made the writing of software 
more straightforward, and allowed the programmers to spend more time writing better 
code and debugging problems instead of dealing with the details of the hardware 
interface.  As processor capability increased, the signal processing applications were 
migrated to the Intel x86 family of processors (using the Linux operating system), 
significantly reducing acquisition cost.  The technology insertions in 2002 and 2004 
continued the migration to mainstream COTS hardware and software, when both the 
signal processing servers and display servers were changed to Intel XEON-based servers 
running at higher clock speeds.  Now that both the display and signal processing servers 
were using a common hardware baseline, data transfer was now more straightforward, 
simplifying software development.  The process has expanded from what was simply a 
single sonar sensor and processor, to a complex system of systems that includes all 
sensors, ship's navigation, combat/fire control, and ship monitoring functions (Kerr 
2004). 
The A-RCI program addressed the challenge of modernizing the Navy’s sonar capability, 
while under severe budgetary pressure, with an innovative approach that was able to 
leverage the rapid advances in computer technology.  This required a significant cultural 
change, in the contractor, as well as the Navy, that meant the adoption of an open system 
architecture and a retreat from MIL-SPECs.   
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One of the ramifications of this approach was the need to reengineer the logistics support.  
The Navy teamed with the contractor and developed an innovative performance based 
tem design. 
The current perform
logistics concept that proved to be as innovative as the sys
ance based 







                                                
fixed fee) was signed with 
Lockheed Martin's Maritime
Systems & Sensors 
(Manassas)8 in September 
2004.  Lockheed Ma
provides comprehensive A-
and Virginia Class sonar,
combat control, and architecture (S/CC/A) supply chain management services t
NAVICP, that include: requisition processing, material fulfillment and transportation
inventory management and storage, material repair, and feedback on the technical 
insertion program.   
The contract also identifies simple, yet very specific, performance metrics.  The 
requirement for supply material availability is 85 percent.  The contract also specifies 
average customer wait time for both continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside the 
continental U.S. (OCONUS).  These are 2 and 3 days respectively, for issue priority 
group (IPG) I, and within the required delivery date for IPG II (Weir 2006). 
For the A-RCI contract, there are certain advantages to using a cost plus contract 
structure.  Since COTS computer hardware prices generally trend downward, the 
customer could actually pay higher prices under a fixed price contract.  Additionally, this 
contract provides flexibility to adapt to the rapidly changing technology; a fixed price 
contract would be too ‘rigid’ in this dynamic environment and reduce flexibility for the 
Navy.  The award fee provides an incentive to stay within budget; and, since reduced 
costs increase the contractor’s rate of return, and there are additional incentives for the 
 
8 MS2 is a Lockheed Martin business unit with six major sites: Moorestown, NJ; Syracuse, NY; Eagan, 
MN; Baltimore, MD; Manassas, VA and Akron, OH 
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contractor to reduce costs.  Moreover, reducing costs allows the contractor to be 
considered favorably by the Navy for continued work on this effort (Weir 2006).   
The program is responsible for the entire requisition process from identifying the required 
parts up until they are transported to the fleet or to the point of debarkation (for overseas 
delivery) where responsibility ends.  The program facility is the hub for the entire process 
of storing inventory and repairing failed material.  The program manager monitors this 
entire process and can keep improving it through trend analysis and feedback to customer 
and internal teams, and can help them decide on item replenishment on the basis of 
various factors.  Besides, the facility is the only one of its kind in the world to have a 
testing lab, which helps reduce cycle time and cost (Manassas visit). 
C. Program Operation 
This PBL program is responsible for managing the entire A-RCI and S/CC/A supply 
chain process, from processing the requisition through the transportation to the fleet or 
the point of debarkation (for overseas delivery).  The inventory is stored and repaired at 
the contractor’s Manassas facility.  As noted above, this facility also has a testing lab, 
which helps reduce cycle time and cost. 
Requisition Processing 
The process begins with requisitions submitted by the fleet online, directly to the 
contractor (the contractor receives 40-50 requisitions per week).  Once these are accepted 
and processed, a system engineer identifies and locates the inventory, and plans the repair 
and/or replacement.  The appropriate software (and/or firmware) is loaded and then the 
replacement parts are fully tested in the lab.  The parts are then shipped via DHL/FedEx 
(USPS in the case of classified material).  Unless there is an emergency, requisitions are 
processed during normal duty hours Monday through Friday and 8 am to 12 pm on 





The program has developed an innovative approach to minimize the required inventory.  
With the installation of a new system, the program does not buy any spare parts for 
repairs, since the exact nature and amount of the requirement is unknown.  If a repair part 
is needed at this time, the PBL program “borrows” one from the vendor or the production 
line.  In effect, during the first two years of an upgrade, the contractor facility fends for 
itself and does not buy a part unless absolutely necessary—maintaining a near-zero 
inventory of spare parts.  As submarine systems are upgraded, the phased-out systems are 
stored, and used to support that variant of the system, that is still operating with the fleet.  
This procedure also cuts down on the need to buy dedicated repair parts.  Additionally, 
when the removed, defective part is repaired, it is used to replace the one “borrowed” 
from the vendor/factory or taken from the warehouse.  Once a failure history is 
developed, the contractor then maintains some minimal inventory.  This process not only 
saves time, but reduces costs; which are the ultimate objectives of the program (Weir 
2006). 
Web Interface 
Lockheed Martin has developed a web-based portal to support this program, called the 
Supportability Integrated Logistics Capability (SILCTM).  All stakeholders (logistics, 
systems engineering, vendors, etc.) have access to most functions on the portal.  Using 
this tool allows them to follow the entire replenishment process in real time.  Data that 
these stakeholders can see includes: platform system details, including configuration; 
system health reports, maintenance trend analysis (e.g. failure rates for parts); supply 
support demand; total asset visibility (TAV); requisition process (real time data); pending 
requests for requisitions; real-time report lookup; and maintenance and training material.  
There is also a data mining capability that can search through the program’s data, to 
include the legacy systems.  Finally, the portal also records the loan of parts from the 




Other key features 
This program also has the ability to provide valuable feedback.  For example, 50 percent 
of items that are returned for repair fall into two categories.  One, are those identified as 
“no trouble found,” that means there was no hardware malfunction, and only a simple 
system reboot was required to affect the repair.  The other category is those faults that are 
classified as “maintenance induced.”  One specific case in point is a problem found with 
the operation of the power button; when it was held in too long, the server loose its 
unique setting, and would be reset to factory defaults.  Once this was identified, new 
manuals cautioned the users of the impacts of this action, and also provided the 
procedures to restore the unique user settings (Weir 2006). 
D. Performance Metrics 
Contract performance for the period of September 2004 through April 2005, is 
summarized below.  Figure 14 shows the material availability, the contract requirement is 
85 percent, and the customer goal is 90 percent.  During this period, the supply material 
availability consistently exceeded the contract requirement and the cumulative average 
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Figure 14. Supply Availability (Weir 2006) 
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Figure 15 shows the average customer wait time for issue priority group I, for both 
CONUS and outside CONUS (Hawaii) locations.  Both averages exceed the contract 
requirements.  For issue priority group II, all the requisitions were filled within the 






CONUS 1.8 2.0 1.1 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.9
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All IPG II+ reqns filled within Required Delivery Date (RDD)




All IPG II+ reqns filled within Required Delivery Date (RDD)
 
Figure 15. Average Customer Wait Time (Weir 2006) 
 
Throughout the period of performance, the contractor has also steadily reduced the costs 
of repair.  The average cost of a repair was estimated, based on the then current costs, to 
be approximately $7400.  The current average repair cost is slightly under $ 5000, a 
reduction of 32 percent (Kerr 2004; Applied Research Laboratory 2006; Rosenberger 
2005; Boudreau 2006; Weir 2006).  
E. Future Outlook 
The A-RCI and Virginia S/CC/A PBL program has demonstrated the ability to support 
the operational fleet, using multiple configurations of commercial hardware.  Two of the 
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key reasons for the success have been the flexibility of both the partners (contractor and 
the Navy), and the tailoring of the program to meet its unique requirements.  However, 
the program continues to look for ways to improve its support to fleet operations.   
The program recently completed a pilot program that installed hardware, software, along 
with COTS based logistic capability, to demonstrate the ability to achieve a 90 day period 
of Maintenance Free Operation (MFOP) with a confidence of 95 percent or above.  The 
results of the pilot far exceeded anyone’s expectations.  The four submarines that 
participated required no maintenance, on that portion of the system designed to be 
maintenance free, for far in excess of the 90 day goal (see Figure 16).  Based on this 
success, the Navy plans to continue this strategy on those four submarines (Rosenberger 
2005).   
Pilot Platform Start Date Days in Pilot Final Available Spares 
SSS 710 3-Sept-2004 392 12 of 12 
SSS 721 5-Sep-2004 390 14 of 15 
SSS 713 22-Nov-2004 312 11 of 14 
SSS 705 8-Apr-2005 175 14 of 14 
 
Figure 16. MFOP Pilot Program Final Results 
 
The MFOP program also provided additional benefits; it developed and implemented a 
functionality to support the A-RCI system with Distance Support initiatives that: perform 
statistical analysis of system performance and improve availability; monitor system 
parameters and make recovery recommendations to system operators; and provide fast 
path linkages to digital technical manuals from the tactical display.  With these 
improvements fleet operators can perform keyboard diagnostics, software reloads and 
other maintenance actions without opening cabinets or handling equipment (Rosenberger 
2005).  This approach has proven to be viable, improving operational capability, while 
reducing the logistics burden. 
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V.  Findings and Conclusions 
A. DoD Must Move to a World Class System 
Based on the cases we studied, it is apparent that performance based logistics can be used 
to transform traditional weapon system support models.  The PBL programs provided 
improved performance—improved availability and readiness levels—that approached 
commercial industry standards.  In the longer term, as improved designs are deployed, the 
PBL programs will also demonstrate increases in dependability.  Additionally, with PBL 
support, Combatant Commanders can project and sustain forces with a smaller logistic 
footprint, an important attribute with the current expeditionary force structure and the 
prospect of the extended global war on terror.  Finally, there is the potential to 
significantly lower the total ownership costs, which can free-up needed funds for force 
modernization.  There is a clear imperative for DoD to accelerate the implementation of 
PBLs in their effort to transform the traditional logistics support for weapon systems. 
In the course of this research, we have identified barriers to PBLs that slow 
implementation, as well as enablers that should be used to accelerate it.  These are 
described below. 
B. Barriers to Implementation 
Although the Department of Defense has made progress toward the goal of using PBL as 
the preferred sustainment strategy for its weapon systems, with some impressive 
successes, the transition has not been as rapid as envisioned.  This is due in large part to 
organizational, political, and business barriers; these are described below: 
Organizational Barriers 
As was illustrated with the virtual program office created to manage the F/A-18 
sustainment, implementing PBLs is a major crosscutting undertaking that impacts many 
government organizations.  In the past, these organizations have often had rivalries, with 
their own distinct priorities, and have competed for budget share and resources.  Many 
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weapon systems still operate with all those impediments, which must be overcome to 
successfully implement PBLs.   
• Cultural 
PBLs often require government organizations to shift their focus and to perform tasks 
that are different from their traditional tasks.  There is, however, a natural cultural 
inertia that resists these, sometimes dramatic, changes.  For example, legacy 
sustainment processes generally involve writing lengthy, detailed design 
specifications and statements of work, which reference many military specifications, 
as well as contract terms and conditions, and attempt to be so comprehensive that 
they cover every possible contingency.  With PBLs, defense organizations are no 
longer writing these detailed specifications, but have had to learn how to write 
performance specifications.   
Buying a performance outcome is significantly different from buying specific items, 
and often requires changes in organizational processes and manpower requirements 
(and, of course, there is a natural desire to protect jobs—both civilian and military).  
Additionally, legacy processes often keep government personnel, such as the contract 
administrator, and the supporting contractor in an arms-length relationship, with little 
trust; while with a PBL, they become active partners; and may, in fact, be selling 
services to the contractor.  This culture of “the proper role of government” can be 
deeply rooted and resistant to change, especially since most government employees 
like to think of themselves as “core.”  Finally, there is a tendency on the part of 
military commanders to want to “see” the required inventory, not to trust a computer-
based response system.   
As a result, a successful logistics transformation will require a sustained leadership 
commitment to change the existing culture and have it embrace the new 




• Human Capital. 
For many of the government’s logistics employees, implementing PBLs changes the 
nature of their work.  They shift from being the “the doers” to becoming “the 
managers of doers.”  As this shift occurs, many functions of the government 
employees will change.  For example, as the cases demonstrated, much of the supply 
chain management was shifted to contractors.  Consequently, the government 
employees that formerly performed these functions will require a new skill set 
focused on the management of performance based contracts, and the relationships that 
result.  This shift will require DoD to develop new strategies to recruit, develop, and 
sustain a workforce prepared for the challenges of their new, more complex roles.   
Political Barriers--The Depot Caucus. 
During the Cold War, the DoD depot capabilities expanded dramatically, with a 
capability to surge to 24 hour a day operations.  When the Cold War ended, and the DoD 
force structure was reduced, there was significant excess depot capacity.  When the DoD 
began to reduce this excess capacity, there was a concern in Congress that those efforts 
could go too far and, ultimately, could undermine U.S. military readiness and 
capabilities.  This became a priority, especially for those members that had defense 
depots in their districts.  Those members formed the Congressional Depot Caucus.  And, 
although the DoD depot workforce was significantly reduced, there are still 
approximately 77,000 employees in the depot workforce, and the Depot Caucus remains 
actively involved in issues that impact them. 
The depot caucus has been effective in passing the statutory restrictions that include the 
Title 10 restrictions that impose the requirement of maintaining an organic “core” 
logistics capability to support maintenance.  DoD is also restricted from spending more 
than 50 percent of funds allocated for depot level maintenance and repair with 
contractors.  Finally, DoD must use either public-private competitions or merit-based 
selection before shifting any depot level maintenance work, valued at more than $3 
million, to the private sector.  These legislative constraints often create barriers to making 
best value decisions and taking advantage of industry’s current capabilities.  
38
Additionally, as the cases demonstrate, the best product support solutions often involve 
partnerships between industry and the organic DoD capabilities.  The maximum benefits 
are accrued only when the best capabilities are leveraged, and this could result in many 
different combinations, with either industry or a government depot leading the program.  
However, this often implies new roles and relationships that could lead to job losses or 
loss of a type of work.  These changes are often resisted by the depot caucus. 
Business Barriers 
• Funding and “Color of Money.” 
Annual fluctuations in DoD budgets can create a problem for PBL implementation; 
they have been shown to work best with longer term commitments and stability (the 
contractor needs to know he will be able to get a return on his improvement 
investment).  Another funding issue is the “color of money.” Since PBLs involve both 
support costs and performance investments, the funding often comes from more than 
one source (using operating and maintenance funds for research and development to 
reduce operating and maintenance costs), creating another source of friction. 
Another potential funding barrier is caused by DoD’s working capital funds—this is 
the fund that the DoD’s providers use to buy spare parts and then sell them to DoD 
customers at a markup.  For example, the Prime Vendor Support (PVS) initiative for 
the Apache helicopter failed in 2000 despite aggressive support from the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (Jacques S. 
Gansler).  The reason the Apache proposal failed was due to the impact it would have 
on the Army’s Working Capital Fund.  If the Apache support were transferred to a 
contractor, the Army Materiel Command stood to lose up to $60 million annually 
from the working capital fund.  Without an appropriate reduction in organic labor, 
this would have driven up the cost of parts for other programs; negating the net 
benefit that would have otherwise accrued to the Army from the Apache decision.  
Efforts to implement PBL will face similar obstacles; they will challenge the income 
streams of DoD providers within the existing sustainment processes (Hurst 2006).   
39
• Technical Data Rights.  
In order to have the maximum flexibility when developing sustainment strategies, it is 
critical for the government to have the necessary technical data (detailed maintenance 
drawings and repair publications that contain specifications and tolerances).  
However, many DoD programs negotiate buying this data separately from 
development and purchase of the weapon system.  Then, if program managers 
encounter funding issues, they often forgo purchasing technical data, to preserve or 
improve weapon system.  Obtaining the data, once the system is purchased, is 
generally more expensive.  However, without the technical data, prudent 
management, oversight, and competition may be precluded. 
• Loss of Competitive Pressure. 
Loss of competitive pressure can occur if an OEM and/or a contractor win a PBL 
contract for an extended time horizon.  Other suppliers may loose the ability to be 
competitive, without a significant investment of resources.  Without competitive 
pressure, the lure of monopoly pricing may exceed the contracts performance 
incentives.  Care must be taken by government managers to maintain competitive 
alternatives, in case the performance deteriorates, or costs begin to rise.   
C. PBL Implementation Enablers 
The following are enablers that can be leveraged to facilitate the transition to 
performance based logistics support within the DoD. 
• Alignment of contractor incentives with performance requirements. 
It is critical that the PBL incentives be carefully structured and aligned with the 
performance requirements of the system.  With the incentives aligned, integration, 
between the provider and customer is generally improved.  The support provider, 
appropriately empowered, can then work to improve logistics efficiency, improve 
performance, reduce costs, and make reliability improvements that reduce life cycle 
costs—this results in a win-win for both customer and provider. 
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• Performance metrics  
Performance metrics, rooted in a Performance Based Agreement, provide a clear and 
objective way to measure the progress of the support provider.  The Performance 
Based Agreement should specify a range of support to accommodate changing 
priorities and resources available, and therefore give flexibility to the derived metrics.  
The metrics need to be straightforward, measurable, and achievable.   
• A total life-cycle systems management perspective 
While the DoD is implementing this new sustainment strategy, the DoD inventory 
will include legacy/fielded systems for an additional 25-40 years.  A life-cycle based 
perspective will improve reliability and maintainability, and better manage the cost.  
Even when viewed through the prism of total life cycle systems management, PBL 
programs still need a solid business case analysis (BCA). 
When adopting a PBL approach, the product support integrator still has many 
alternatives, such as structuring the program at the system or sub-system level, and 
the mix of organic and contractor support.  The BCA will allow these alternatives to 
be compared.  The construct that provides the best life-cycle value can then be 
identified and selected.   
• Supply chain management  
Material support is a critical link in the supportability of weapon systems.  The best 
skilled labor, advanced technology, and performance mean little without the “right 
part, at the right place, at the right time.”  Supply chain management is an area where 
the commercial sector has developed superior capabilities, and is a primary target for 
incorporation into PBL implementation.  For example, in the case of aviation tires, 
the contractor has assumed responsibility for all supply chain functions, with 
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ips enable the 
compliance with statutory requirements, preclude the investment in redundant 
apabilities, and yet still maintain single point accountability. 
Commercial-off-the-shelf  
The DoD should make maximum use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) system
This would leverage the private sector’s cutting edge technology and, at the sam
time, reduce the problems involved with the public-private interface.  Gener
when organizations use COTS, they shorten the development cycle, minimize 
development risk, reduce ‘scope cr
commercial logistics capabili
Public-Private Partnerships  
Public-private partnership, to implement PBL, can take many forms that range from
joint public-private undertakings, to private sector participation in some aspect of 
weapon system support, to direct sales of articles or services to the private sector.  
complex form of work-sharing, and can even be fully integrated in a single facility.  
It is essential to achieve the right public-private mix for each program, with clearl
defined and measurable expectations.  In addition to satisfying the statutory 
requirements, using the strengths of the organic and contractor organizations can 
provide a better logistics solution.  For example, having a contractor buy consumab
parts from DLA, means the contractor can leverage DLA’s greater buying powe
not have to duplicate a capability that already exists within the DoD.  A capability 
advantage that exists with the original equipment manufacturers is their greater 
technical know-how and superior design capability, since they developed the 
This competency, which is difficult to duplicate, is often a key requirement for 






 open-architecture I.T. infrastructure can facilitate the required public-
private integration with the varied organizations and the many enterprise-wide 
ent.  
arts.  
antage in technical and supply 
chain management issues, allowing the product support integrator to focus, not on 
rapidly, efficiently, and effectively; or slowly, begrudgingly, and with great cost?  If we 
are to maintain our military and economic security, we do not believe there is a choice.   
An Effective I.T. infrastructure 
A secure,
systems. 
E. Conclusion  
The traditional way DoD did its logistics business is not suitable for today’s environm
Operational requirements and funding pressures are driving the need for logistics 
transformation.  Performance Based Logistics has demonstrated that, when properly 
implemented, it can play a significant role in transforming traditional sustainment 
strategies.  Integrating the strengths of the organic capabilities, with those of the private 
sector, results in a win-win solution where the whole is greater than the sum of its p
The support providers can leverage their competency adv
individual transactions, but on performance outcomes.   
The policy framework and the technology are available to move to a broader and more 
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